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Mays: Business Associations

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
MARSHALL

T. MAYS:: AND LAW QUARTERLY STAFF'
Corporations

The most significant development in the field of Corporation Law is the enactment by the General Assembly's 1962
session of the South Carolina Business Corporation Law of
1962. This comprehensive new statute will, on its January
1, 1964 effective date, supplant all of the provisions of Title
12 of the 1952 Code relating to business corporations, although those sections dealing with eleemosynary corporations
and special types of corporate enterprise will continue in
force. The new corporation statute thus joins the South
Carolina version of the Uniform Securities Act (passed by
the 1961 session of the General Assembly) in effecting a
complete modernization of the basic statutes governing the
activities of corporations, and thus will materially assist in
the development and expansion of business enterprise in this
State.
Because of the wide publicity which the new Corporation
Act has received, it will not be the subject of comment in this
Survey issue. However, in the Spring of 1963, the Law
Quarterly will release a symposium issue containing a full
discussion of the new law and its various provisions, by
various members of the Bar, together with student contributions on recent corporate law problems.
During the Survey period, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina had occasion to apply to a petition for a workman's
compensation award the settled principle that, within a family
of affiliated and subsidiary corporations, the separate corporate entity will be obserevd unless there are compelling
reasons to require the court to "pierce the corporate veil"
and to impose liability without regard to the formal distinctness of corporations. In Brown v. Moorhead Oil Co.,
an individual (not a party to the action) owned and operated
four separate corporations engaged in various phases of the
business of selling and distributing petroleum products, tire
recapping, and "similar business activities."' One corporation
*Mays and Mays, Greenwood, S. C.
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("Crown") handled the tire recapping phase of the business.
Another corporation ("Moorhead") sold and distributed products at wholesale and retail, and operated a number of
service stations. The remaining two corporations were not
involved in the case. The compensation claimant was employed by Crown, which was not subject to the Workman's
Compensation Act because it had fewer than the minimum
number of employees and had not elected to come under the
Act. The claimant asserted that he was an employee of
Moorhead, which was subject to the Act, on the theory that
since there was common stock control and close integration,
all of the corporations were owned and operated as a single
enterprise. The Commission so held, but the Supreme Court
reversed the trial court which had upheld the Commission's
ruling.
The Court examined the evidence with a view to determining whether Moorhead was "a separate and distinct corporate
unit" from Crown and ruled that:
There is insufficient evidence to justify a conclusion that
either corporation was the instrumentality of the other.
And the mere fact that the entire stock in the two corporations was owned by the same person does not operate
to create an identity of corporate interest between the
companies, or create the relationship of principal and
agent, or representative, or alter ego between the two.
The Court indicated that the ultimate test is whether it is
"in the furtherance of justice" to disregard corporate entity,
and concluded, on the evidence, that it was not appropriate
to do so since the facts indicated that the various corporations
were kept formally separate and distinct, that the relation
was one of affiliation growing out of common stock ownership rather than a parent-subsidiary, connection, and, perhaps
most significant, that there was no indication that the multiple corporations were established to evade the requirement
of the Workman's Compensation Act. Stated somewhat differently, the mere fact that an employee would be covered
by the Act if the separate corporate entity were disregarded
is not, by itself, enough to justify the court in overriding
the division of various phases, even of a single business,
among several corporations. For clearly there are legitimate
reasons for forming multiple corporations, not the least of
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which is that the federal income tax impact is appreciably
lessened.
Partnerships
Two cases during the Survey period dealt with problems
arising out of the dissolution of partnerships. Thus, in Katt
v. Walling,2 the Court had earlier ordered the dissolution of
a partnership which it had found existed between the plaintiff and defendant in the present action, and had appointed
a receiver to take charge of the partnership affairs. In the
order appealed from, the trial judge directed the sale of
certain undisputed partnership assets, excepting from the
order a tract of land as to which there was an unresolved
question of its status as a partnership asset. However, the
sale of the undisputed partnership assets was appropriate
since the continued maintenance of some of them (several
large dogs) was costly, and the other assets (the farm machinery and equipment) were of no further use to the former
partners. Thus, in the interests of conserving the partnership
assets, the trial judge was held to have correctly exercised
his discretion, the Supreme Court observing that "the handling of a partnership dissolution" is "discretionary with
the Court and the facts in each particular case should govern."
Few v. Few3 alleged breach of a contract between two
brothers engaged in cattle raising. The substance of the contract was that each would pay one-half of the expenses of
the cattle raising operations which were carried out on a
tract of land previously purchased by the brothers and held
by them as tenants in common. Defenses were asserted,
together with counterclaims by the defendant as to the cost
of improvements, repairs to the land and buildings, purchase
of needed farm equipment, and the like. The Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's judgment sustaining demurrers,
to the defenses and conterclaims on various grounds.
The Court treated counterclaims as essentially a demand
for an accounting among partners "even though a partnership is not alleged in words." And in such an accounting, it
is unnecessary to make a demand and show a refusal of
the demand. This ruling rests upon the fiduciary relationship
among partners which entitles any partner to an accounting
"whenever the circumstances render it just and reasonable."
2. 239 S. C. 17, 121 S. E. 2d 233 (1961).
3.239 S. C.321, 122 S. E. 2d 829 (1961).
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Moreover, the accounting applies not just to articles which
may have been converted, sold or otherwise disposed of,
but also determines "the status of the various articles and
assets belonging to the parties to this action as tenants in
common or as partners" and within their possession.
Several dicta usefully summarize fundamental concepts
of partnership law. Thus, the Court declares that partnership property (at least personalty) is owned "not by the
parties individually but by the partnership" and that each
partner has "an equal right to the possession and control
of the joint property," so that no one has an exclusive right
to possess any particular item of property or "any proportional part of any article of partnership property." Hence,
possessory actions such as replevin cannot be maintained.
The Court, however, mistakenly differentiates real and personal property owned by a partnership, by asserting that:
. . . unlike the rule in the case of real property, each
partner has an equal right to the possession and control
of the joint property.
But Section 25(2) (a) 4 of the Uniform Partnership Act
specifically provides that, as to "specific partnership property" (which includes real property under Sections 8 and
10) ,1 "a partner... has an equal right with his partners to
possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes."
Finally, the Court accurately notes that the same rules
apply to partnerships and joint ventures, and therefore :it
is unnecessary to determine whether the cattle raising operations feel into one or the other classification.

4.

CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA . 52-52 (2) (a) (1952).
5. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 52-13, 52-22 (1952).
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